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Gender differences in the willingness to compete may explain the small percentage of 
women in top-level positions in business, science, or politics. This research examines with a 
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) the conditions, including gender, that relate 
to competition preferences and the different paths that may lead to decide enter competition. 
The results of the economic experiment show that no single condition but combinations of 
characteristics explain preferences for competition. Furthermore, results show that experience 
in competitive sports relates to a higher self-confidence and increases the willingness to enter 
in competitive systems. Interestingly, one of the causal paths leading to enter competition is 
being a risk-averse woman with experience in competitive sports. These results provide insights 
to guide policy interventions to reduce the gender gap in preferences for competition and, 
therefore, to rise the percentage of women in top-level positions. 
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1.    Introduction 
Recent research in economics shows a gender gap in the willingness to compete, with 
women shying away from competition more than men do (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Niederle 
& Vesterlund, 2007; 2011). This gender difference in preferences toward competition seems 
critical to explain the small percentage of women in top-level positions in business, science, or 
politics (Blau et al., 2010; Cason et al., 2010; Datta Gupta et al., 2013; Dohmen & Falk, 2011; 
Gneezy et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004; Niederle &Vesterlund, 
2007; 2011; Weichselbaumer & Winter-Ebmer, 2007). Consequently, research and policy 
interventions explore ways to increase women’s competitive behavior (Balafoutas & Sutter, 
2012; Calsamiglia et al., 2013; Miller & Segal, 2012; Niederle et al., 2013; Villeval, 2012).  
However, competitive behavior might not always be desirable. Some studies relate 
women’s lower preferences for competition to positive consequences for the general economic 
well-being. Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) show that increasing the fraction of women traders in 
the market reduces the magnitude of the speculative price bubbles such as the one causing the 
financial crisis in 2008. They argue that women’s higher risk aversion and lower preferences 
for competition seem to trigger this result. Charness and Rustichini (2011) relate women’s 
lower willingness to compete with higher cooperative behavior. Furthermore, their research on 
gender differences in cooperation suggests that females cooperate more often and men 
cooperate less often when their gender peers observe them. Charness and Rustichini (2011) 
conclude that men prefer signaling to other men that they are tough, whereas women prefer to 
show other women they are cooperative. This result appears to indicate that salient group 
membership such as gender influences behavior. Similarly, Ackerlof and Kranton (2010) and 






Differences in willingness to compete may relate to not only gender differences in social 
identity or personal traits such as cooperativeness and risk aversion but also to differences in 
confidence. Kamas and Preston (2012) find that, conditional on ability, self-confidence 
eliminates gender differences in decisions to enter winner-take-all (WTA) competition. 
However, this result does not hold for business school students in the Kamas and Preston 
(2012)’s analysis. Gender differences in willingness to compete persist in business school 
students even after accounting for risk aversion and confidence. Conversely, women out-
compete men in Gneezy et al.’s (2009) study in a matrilineal society. These findings, together 
with previous literature’s results depending on the tasks performed, may indicate that self-
confidence plays a role in the willingness to compete. The inclusion of self-confidence in 
studies on gender differences in competition preferences is important for policy interventions 
because appropriate education and information may correct lower confidence. 
Policy interventions devoted to increase women’s willingness to compete need to take 
into account the related conditions and behaviors. Consequently, research methods should 
account for the causal complexity and should study the different paths that could lead to decide 
entering competition.  
Previous studies mainly present laboratory economic experiments and apply 
econometric models to analyze the main net effects of gender on the willingness to compete. 
This study aims to analyze the recipes of conditions that relate to competition preferences, 
including gender, and the different paths that lead to decide entering competitive environments. 
Thus, this study presents a laboratory economic experiment on preferences for competition, and 
uses a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (FsQCA) to analyze results. The fsQCA 
(Ragin, 2000) helps capture complex patterns of causation and shows different combination of 





The results show that differences in preferences for competition do not come from the 
gender alone, but from several combinations of causal conditions. Furthermore, results suggest 
that experience in competitive sports relates to a higher self-confidence and serves as a path to 
increase integration in competitive systems.  
Following this introduction, section 2 presents the details of the experimental design. 
Section 3 presents the method of analysis and reports the results. Section 4 discusses the results 
and offers some conclusions. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
To explore the conditions related to the decision of entering competition, and the gender 
effect, this study replicates Niederle and Vesterlund’s (2007) economic experiment with 
undergraduate students from economics and business careers. This study experimentally tests 
subjects’ self-confidence and cooperative behavior, measures attitudes toward risk, and records 
subjects’ experience in competitive games and sports. The study further analyzes the results 
using fsQCA. 
The laboratory economic experiment starts, as in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), with 
subjects adding sets of five two-digit numbers during five minutes at a piece-rate payment 
scheme of 0,25 euros per correct addition (Round 1 in Task 1). In a second round, subjects 
repeat the task under a WTA competitive payment scheme: A tournament in groups of four 
randomly selected subjects (two men and two women) in which only the subject who solves the 
largest number of correct additions within the group receives a payment (1 euro per correct 
sum). Subjects in the third round of Task 1 repeat the task and decide which one of these two 
payment schemes they prefer to apply. Differently from Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), 
subjects do not receive information about the number of their correct additions until the end of 





on their relative performance (within the group of four). The subject’s believes on their relative 
performance compared to their actual position within the group measure each subject´s self-
confidence. 
After this task, subjects start a decomposed game to test their cooperative behavior 
(Brosig, 2002; Liebrand, 1984; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). Subjects make 24 choices 
between two “own-other” payoff combinations. Payoffs come from all 24 choices subjects and 
partners make. Using a standard classification procedure for this technique, subjects classify 
for this study as cooperative or non-cooperative (Griesinger & Livingston, 1973). 
The third task measures attitudes toward risk. Subjects make choices in nine lottery pairs 
as in Comeig et al. (2013). The lotteries’ design follows Blavatskyy’s (2009) test on risk 
attitudes, which builds on Holt and Laury (2002).  
At the end of the experiment, subjects answer a social questionnaire that includes 
questions about experience in competitive videogames and sports; subjects receive the payoffs 
in cash (19 euros on average) afterwards.  
Table 1 describes the conditions this research examines and the data from the 
experiment. 
Table 1 here 
The 104 subjects of the experiment are students from the Economics, Business, Finance 
and Accounting, and International Business degrees at the University of Valencia (52 men, 52 
women). The computerized experiment was run in the fall 2014 at the Laboratory for Research 
in Experimental Economics (LINEEX). At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects read 
the instructions and solved their questions. During the experiment, subjects received no 
feedback on their performance and could not communicate with other subjects. (Instructions 





The fsQCA analysis of the experimental data includes only 68 subjects (31 men and 37 
women); that is, subjects who were consistent in the risk-attitude elicitation task. Consistent 
subjects are those with a unique switching point (USP) from the safe option to the risky option. 
Risk-averse subjects switch to the risky option after the fifth lottery (I>5). Additionally, fsQCA 
requires the calibration of the condition that proxies individual’s ability, the number of correct 
additions in the piece rate round (SCOR1). The number of correct sums in round 1 of Task 1 
(with the minimum at 0 sums, the maximum at 13 and average at 5.57 correct sums) translates 
into a five-point scale (0; 0.2; 0.5; 0.8; 1) and three percentiles (0.95; 0.5; and 0.05) of the 
condition’s presence (Ragin et al., 2009). 
This study uses fsQCA to analyze the experimental results because this type of analysis 
shows the different paths that lead to reach the outcome, not only the main influences, which is 
especially appropriate to analyze behavior, connections among experiences and behavior, and 
to inform policy-makers (Woodside, 2013; 2014).  
 
3. Results 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show a descriptive overview of the experimental results of Task 
1 by round and gender. Results from round 3 show that women tend to enter competition less 
than men do (see Figure 2, graph B). However, whereas Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find 
73% of men and 35% of women choose competition, the gender difference is smaller in this 
study: 55% of men and 45% of women decide to enter competition. Kamas and Preston (2012) 
show no significant difference between men and women for STEM majors’ students but do 
show a significant difference for business school students because of the highly competitive 





In addition, in line with previous literature, results show that the number of correct 
additions is higher for subjects in WTA tournament than in the piece-rate payment scheme (see 
Figure 1, rounds 1 and 2, and Figure 2, graph A). 
Results in this experiment replicate previous findings. However, instead of explaining 
these findings with a standard analysis on gender main effects, this study applies the fsQCA  
(fsQCA 2.0, www.fsqca.com, from Ragin et al., 2009) to examine the combinations of causal 
conditions that explain preferences for competition, including the effect of gender on those 
preferences.  
Figure 1 here. 
Figure 2 here. 
The fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) models the concept of 
conjectural causation: combinations of various causal conditions, rather than one condition 
alone, may lead to the outcome. 
 
3.1       Necessary conditions 
The results of the fsQCA in Table 2 show than none of the causal conditions alone, 
including gender, are a necessary condition for the outcome. A condition or a combination of 
conditions is necessary or almost always necessary if the consistency score exceeds 0.9 (see 
Schneider et al. 2010, p. 254 for further explanation on the measure, or Ragin, 2006). 
The gender (GEN, gen) of the subjects is the less necessary condition (consistency 
score= 0.5) for the decision to enter the WTA tournament (dec). However, the lack of 
mathematical ability (scor1), and having previous experience in competitive sports (SPOR) are 
the conditions almost necessary to decide whether to enter the WTA competition (dec), with 





This result confirms that differences in preferences for competition do not come from 
the individual’s gender alone, but from sets of connected conditions. 
Table 2 here. 
The last part of Table 2 shows whether two conditions, one or the other, are necessary 
conditions for the outcome, that is, if these two conditions are “substitutable necessary 
conditions” in fsQCA (Ragin, 2006). Having previous experience in competitive sports relates 
to high self-confidence (consistency score of OVERCONF+SPOR = 0.94), and one or the other 
are necessary conditions for the outcome. However, having previous experience in competitive 
sports acts as a functional equivalent to masculine gender (consistency score of GEN+SPOR = 
1), that is, men (GEN) have more experience in competitive sports than women have.  
Furthermore, these two expressions are not trivial for the decision on entering or not 
WTA competition (coverage rate of OVERCONF+SPOR and GEN+SPOR are 0.52 and 0.51, 
respectively). A necessary condition is trivial and yields a coverage rate near 0 if the condition 
occurs in all cases regardless of the presence or absence of the outcome (Ragin, 2006). 
This result suggests that the active promotion of competitive sports among women may 
be a recommendable policy intervention to increase women’s self-confidence and women’s 
integration in competitive systems as businesses, science, or politics, in line with cooperation 
practitioners’ wisdom (Meier, 2005; Kirk, 2012). However, fsQCA results do not explain 
whether the strong relationship between men and competitive sports comes from inherent 
gender preferences, social identity, or education. The question on the self-selection in 
competitive sports remains open. 
 





Table 3 presents the intermediate solution with the conditions and/or combination of 
conditions sufficient to reach the outcome. Ragin (2008) recommends the intermediate solution 
for interpretation of results.  
Table 3 here. 
Each line describes a combination of conditions (or causal path) that leads to the 
decision of entering the WTA tournament instead of selecting a piece-rate payment. As Table 
3 shows, all causal paths consist of combinations of conditions. No single condition is sufficient 
to account for entering the competition.  
The total coverage of the seven causal paths in Model 1 is 0.62, indicating that these 
combinations of conditions cover most of the subject’s choices (dec).  
The most important combination of conditions that leads to the decision of entering the 
WTA competition (raw coverage = 0.15, unique coverage = 0.15) is having experience in 
competitive sports and games, together with the lack of risk aversion and the lack of cooperative 
personality (GAME*SPOR*averisk*coop). Previous literature results, which generally study 
main net effects in econometric models, traditionally capture this combination of conditions 
and thus relate gender differences in willingness to compete to women’s higher risk aversion 
and social preferences towards cooperation and equality. However, analyzing results with 
fsQCA shows that this path is not the only path to decide entering a competition. 
The second empirically important causal path that leads to the outcome (raw coverage 
= 0.15, unique coverage = 0.12) combines masculine gender with a risk-averse, cooperative, 
and not-overconfident attitude (GEN*AVERISK*overconf*COOP). This seems to indicate 
that men, even being risk averse, not-overconfident, and cooperative enter WTA tournaments. 
The next three causal paths contain the experience in competitive sports (SPOR) among 






The third recipe contains experience in sports, overconfidence, and cooperativeness 
(game*SPOR*OVERCONF*COOP) (raw coverage = 0.9, unique coverage = 0.9). 
The fourth recipe includes being woman among the conditions 
(gen*game*SPOR*AVERISK). Women with experience in competitive sports decide to enter 
competition even when being risk-averse (raw coverage = 0.9, unique coverage = 0.9). This 
result is important for policy interventions because women’s experience in sports, contrary to 
personal traits (such as cooperativeness or risk aversion), might increase with appropriate 
information or the promotion of new and more women-appealing sports. 
The second part of Table 3 presents the intermediate solution of Model 2, a model that 
excludes gender from the causal conditions. The total coverage of the causal paths in Model 2 
is 0.56 (0.62 in Model 1), indicating that the gender effect is not decisive. Combinations of 
causal conditions other than gender cover most of the subject’s decisions about entering 
competition (56%). 
The first and second combination of conditions leading to the decision of entering a 
WTA tournament instead of selecting a piece-rate payment (raw coverage = 0.27 and 0.15, 
unique coverage = 0.07 and 0.06, respectively) include experience in competitive sports 
(SPOR) in the recipe. The two next causal paths leading to the decision of entering a WTA 
tournament include OVERCONF among the conditions, which closely relates to experience in 
competitive sports (see necessary conditions). Thus, the intermediate solution of Model 2 again 
shows that experience in competitive sports relates to a higher self-confidence and increases 
the integration in competitive systems. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
This study presents the first fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (FsQCA) on 
gender differences in preferences for competition. Previous research analyzes the main effects 





and generally finds that women present a lower preference for competitive environments. This 
study, however, seeks to analyze the connected conditions, including gender, that relate to 
competition preferences and the different paths that may lead to decide entering a competition. 
Understanding complex connections in behavior, preferences, and social experiences may help 
establish responsible policy interventions on the gender gap in the willingness to compete. 
The fsQCA results on the economic experiment show that the willingness to compete 
does not come from the individual’s gender alone but from sets of connected conditions. One 
combination of conditions that leads to enter competition is the lack of risk aversion and the 
lack of cooperative personality together with experience in competitive sports and games. This 
path reflects the main effects that generally show previous literature, which relate gender 
differences in willingness to compete to women’s higher risk aversion, and preference towards 
cooperation and equality. However, analyzing results with fsQCA shows that this is not the 
only path to decide entering a competition. 
Interestingly, one of the causal paths leading to enter competition includes being a 
woman among the conditions: Women with experience in competitive sports decide to enter 
competition even when being risk-averse. This result is important for policy interventions, 
because women’s experience in sports might increase with proper information or by promoting 
sports attractive enough for women. 
Furthermore, results show that experience in competitive sports relates to a higher self-
confidence and generates a higher willingness to enter in other competitive environments. 
These results provide interesting insights to guide policy interventions to reduce the gender gap 
in preferences for competition and, therefore, to rise the percentage of women in top-level 
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Table 1. Outcome and causal conditions: Definition and estimate. 
 
Condition Definition Estimate Mean 
Gender 
(GEN) 
Value = 1 for men 
Value = 0 for women 
Binary 0.46 
Decision in round 3 of 
Task 1 
(DEC) 
Value =1 for not entering 
competition (chooses piece-rate 
payment) 
Value = 0 for entering competition 
(chooses WTA tournament) 
Binary 0.50 
Number of correct 
sums in round 1,Task 1 
(SCOR1) 
Number of additions correctly solved 







Value =1 for those overestimating 
their position within the group in 
round 2 




Value =1 for risk-averse subjects 





Value =1 for subjects with strong 
experience in competitive sports 





Value =1 for subjects with strong 
experience in videogames 




Value =1 for cooperative subjects 
Value = 0 otherwise 
Binary 0.37 
 







Table 2. Analysis of necessary conditions 
Outcome: dec 
Condition Consistency Coverage 
scor1 0.87 0.54 
SPOR 0.82           0.51 
AVERISK 0.71           0.47 
coop 0.62 0.49 
overconf 0.59           0.45 
GAME 0.53           0.45 
GEN 0.50 0.55 
gen 0.50           0.46 
game 0.47           0.57 
OVERCONF 0.41 0.58 
COOP 0.38           0.52 
averisk 0.29           0.59 
spor 0.18           0.46 
SCOR1 0.13           0.34 
GEN+SPOR 1.00 0.51 
OVERCONF+SPOR 0.94           0.52 
Causal conditions with capital letter: indicate the presence of causal condition studied. 







Table 3. Sufficient combinations of conditions for entering in a WTA tournament 







GAME*SPOR*averisk*coop            0.15     0.15 0.83 
GEN*AVERISK*overconf*COOP              0.15     0.12 1.00 
game*SPOR*OVERCONF*COOP                           0.09     0.09 1.00 
gen*game*SPOR*AVERISK                        0.09     0.09 0.75 
GEN*GAME*SPOR*COOP                         0.09     0.06 1.00 
GEN*game*spor*AVERISK*OVERCONF*coop    0.06     0.06 1.00 
GEN*GAME*averisk*OVERCONF*coop          0.03     0.03 1.00 
    
Solution Coverage: 0.62   
Solution Consistency: 0.91   
 







game*SPOR*AVERISK 0.27 0.07 0.75 
GAME*SPOR*averisk*coop 0.15 0.06 0.83 
game*AVERISK*OVERCONF* coop 0.12 0.06 0.80 
GAME*averisk*OVERCONF*coop 0.12 0.03 1.00 
game*AVERISK*overconf*COOP 0.12 0.03 0.80 
game*SPOR*OVERCONF*scor1*COOP 0.08 0.03 1.00 
    
Solution Coverage: 0.56   
Solution Consistency: 0.83   
Causal conditions with capital letter indicate the presence of causal condition studied. 
Causal conditions with small letter indicate the absence of that condition. 









Means and standard deviations of correct sums by 68 subjects (31 men and 37 
























Figure 2. Disaggregated results for Round 3 in Task 1 
 








The total sample in round 3 consists of 68 subjects (31 men and 37 women).  
14 men (45%) and 20 women (54%) choose not to compete (piece rate payjment). 
17 men (55%) and 17 women (46%) choose to compete (WTA tournament payment). 
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